How do we manage the administrative state? Different eras have offered different answers (Mosher, 1982) . President Obama assumed the leadership of the state in an era of governance by performance management. The popular stereotype of government may continue to be one of stable and hierarchical bureaucracies governed by rules. Such bureaucracies still exist, but increasingly most public services are provided through networks of public, private, and nonprofit actors whose legitimacy is tied to measurable indicators of performance.
The central importance that performance management has in contemporary administrative practice is allowing it gradually to alter the basic social and organizational processes of governance. This is one of the key mechanisms by which government structures its underlying values and relationships with third-party providers. Indeed, performance management processes are central to some of the essential questions of governance: What are our goals? How do we maintain accountability? How do we exert control? How do citizens experience government itself?
Performance management can be defined as a system that generates performance information through strategic planning and performance measurement routines, and connects this information to decision venues, where, ideally, the information influences a range of possible decisions (Moynihan, 2008) . While descriptively accurate, this definition does not give a sense of the broad reach of performance management. To do so, some have begun to use the term performance regimes to "reflect the fact that the cumulative effect of the application of these tools is greater than the sum of their parts, resulting in a basic and fundamental change in how we govern. The clearest reflection of this change is the unprecedented pressure that public actors are under to perform, in a context where performance is defined by quantitative indicators" .
This article provides an overview of the current era and focuses largely on the federal government. First, I provide a brief history of performance management in the U.S., followed by an examination of the efforts of the Bush administration, along with the nascent themes emerging from the Obama White House. Both Presidents have said that results and performance management are important to their respective administrations. Obama has taken elements of the Bush approach, but is also developing new themes. The second part of the article considers the implication of performance management for governance, and for research in political science.
The introduction and growth of performance regimes will alter some basic political factors, such as information, incentives, power, and accountability. It is reasonable to assume that performance regimes will generate a heterogeneity of responses among public officials. This article examines passive, political, perverse, and purposeful responses to performance regimes. Understanding why and when such responses occur, and their implications for politics and governance, has a high degree of relevance for a variety of subfields of political science beyond public administration, including agency theory, bureaucratic politics, and policy feedback studies.
The Evolution of Performance Management
Performance metrics are not a new idea in American government and can be traced back to the Progressive movement of the early twentieth century (Williams, 2003) . However, adoption has been episodic and application haphazard until the 1990s. In the 1930s, a young Herbert Simon was part of a project advising cities on how to measure performance (Ridley and Simon, 1938) . In 1949, the first Hoover Commission recommended pursuit of performance budgeting in the federal government. But it was not until the 1960s that the Department of Defense pioneered, and the rest of government later adopted, Planning Programming Budgeting Systems -the first serious effort to use performance indicators to inform resource allocation.
The Nixon administration abandoned this initiative to pursue its own strategic planning system, Management by Objectives. This in turn gave way to Zero-Based Budgeting under the Carter administration, which sought to force agencies to justify existing programs during each budget cycle. This, in turn, was abandoned by the Reagan administration. While the 1980s saw experimentation with performance tools such as Total Quality Management and strategic planning (and a growing awareness that other countries were trying to make their bureaucracies more performance-oriented), the sense of concerted effort and political visibility that characterized previous reforms were missing.
An approximate starting point for the most recent wave of performancebased bureaucracy came in 1993, during the first year of the Clinton administration, when the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was passed. GPRA required all agencies to prepare five-year strategic plans, annual performance plans, and performance reports. Because GPRA was in statute, it also promised greater longevity than previous efforts, and still remains the backbone for the federal performance framework. State governments followed the GPRA model, and by the end of the 1990s, all state governments had some form of performance reporting system (Moynihan, 2008) .
The Bush Administration
Even as GPRA was on the books, it did not feature prominently in the Reinventing Government initiative that Vice-President Al Gore oversaw. So the Bush administration provided renewed attention to performance management. President Bush had come to office as the first MBA President, emphasizing a business-like approach to government (Pfiffner, 2007) . In The President's Management Agenda (PMA), Bush outlined the central role of performance in his governing philosophy: "Government should be results-oriented, guided not by process but guided by performance. There comes a time when every program must be judged either a success or a failure. Where we find success, we should repeat it, share it, and make it the standard. And where we find failure, we must call it by its name. Government action that fails in its purpose must be reformed or ended" (OMB, 2001) .
The PMA, authored by the OMB, offered the seemingly indisputable premise that "everyone agrees that scarce federal resources should be allocated to programs that deliver results" (OMB, 2001 ). Yet the Bush administration had a conflicted attitude toward GPRA, seeing it as a useful but unexploited beginning, rather than an end it itself. Despite GPRA, "agencies rarely offer convincing accounts of the results their allocations will purchase" (U.S. OMB, 2001 ). The remedy, according to the PMA, was to integrate performance reviews with budget submissions, assuming that more rational and efficient decisions would result.
Under Bush, the OMB pursued the goal of budget and performance integration in two ways. The first was to integrate more performance data into the congressional budget justifications provided to appropriations subcommittees. The second was to undertake performance reviews of all federal programs over a five-year period, using a diagnostic tool called the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) and beginning in 2002. PART is essentially a set of 30 standard questions that OMB budget examiners, in consultation with agency representatives, used to assess federal programs. It collated information from existing performance indicators and program evaluations. Programs were rated as: ineffective, adequate, moderately effective, or effective. If, in OMB's judgment, programs lacked adequate information, they fell into a separate category of results not demonstrated.
If the goal of PART was to foster the systematic use of performance data in decision-making, it failed (see more detailed discussion below). But PART was not merely a symbolic exercise. It required the investment of enormous effort on the part of OMB and agencies. It is an open question as to whether the benefits justified the transaction costs, but PART did create some positive outcomes. It required agencies to articulate performance goals and measures rigorously enough to satisfy OMB analysts, and in some cases, this forced greater clarification of goals, as well as measurement improvements. The standard of proof was positive evidence of results -rather than an absence of obvious failure -and the burden of proof rested on agencies. PART pushed agencies to consider program design and implementation in terms of results and demanded ongoing attention and modification to improve outcomes (Metzenbaum, 2009; Moynihan, 2008) .
PART was also comprehensive. Over a five-year period, 1,016 programs (approximately 98 percent of the federal budget) were "PARTed." Traditionally, the potential of programs was evaluated when first proposed, and performance might be considered through episodic evaluations. For most programs, the annual budget review did not extend beyond examining whether the additional increment requested was justified by service demands and costs. The record of large chunks of government might not be given serious consideration for years at a time, if at all. PART provided a standard tool to compare the performance of all federal programs.
Overall, PART resulted in a structured dialogue between the OMB and agencies about performance that would not otherwise have happened. In a break with OMB tradition, detailed assessments of federal programs were made publicly available and easily accessible (on expectmore.gov). For anyone seeking basic knowledge of a specific policy area, PART offered a useful guide. This level of transparency might be considered one of the defining legacies of PART (Dull, 2009a) . PART, along with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, was probably the most significant administrative initiative of the Bush years, intended to signal a seriousness and rationality in public management (Dull, 2006) .
Management issues ultimately did become central to the public perception of the Bush administration. But the irony was that these were for issues unrelated to PART -such as the occupation of Iraq and the response to Hurricane Katrinathat portrayed the administration as ideological, secretive, and inept. One 2006 poll found that the term that the public most frequently associated with President Bush was "incompetent" (Moynihan and Roberts, 2009 ).
The Obama Administration
At the time of this writing, the Obama administration has not outlined how it will pursue performance management, but it is clear that it will be a priority. Early comments from Obama, and from his new appointees at the OMB, suggest some of the themes that will be prominent when a formal management agenda is revealed. As a candidate, Obama used the language of performance in a way that fitted with his image as a pragmatist: programs should be judged on whether they work. This tone was also apparent in his inaugural address: "The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works --whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end. And those of us who manage the public's dollars will be held to account, to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day, because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government" (Obama, 2009) .
Even as Obama framed performance in terms similar to his predecessor, he also sought to distance himself from Bush. Early budget documents criticized the pursuit of ideological goals under the Bush administration, and promised to reconfigure PART. Such language seems to have been a hedge, presented before the new OMB team was fully in place, that both reflected congressional Democrat's criticisms of PART while managing to remain vague on what would happen next. As Obama put together his management team, it became apparent that he would pursue performance by following some Bush initiatives and creating some of his own, while adopting a different tone overall.
The clearest indication of continuity was the decision not to rescind a 2007 Executive Order that established the position of Performance Improvement Officers in each agency. The most notable management change thus far has essentially been an extension of this policy. As President, Obama fulfilled a campaign promise to create the position of Chief Performance Officer. Both Performance Improvement Officer and Chief Performance Officer positions are based on the logic that performance systems would be neglected unless they were put under the authority of specially appointed individuals. Performance Improvement Officers are expected to oversee the performance processes in their agency, and use data to pursue efficiency gains. The Chief Performance Officer, who is also the OMB Deputy Director for Management, has oversight of the government-wide performance apparatus.
For this position, the President hired Jeffrey Zients. Zients came from the private sector where he worked as a management consultant specializing in the application of performance benchmarks. PART will otherwise continue, although in what fashion remains unclear. The ambiguity on this reflects the mixed attitude of the Obama White House toward Bush initiatives. Over a period of five years, PART generated an enormous amount of data across government programs. If nothing else, the Obama White House has shown a preference for data. It has not dismantled the PART website (as the Bush White House did to his predecessor's Reinventing Government initiative).
At the same time, Obama appointees also believe that PART was too broad in its focus: by trying to assess all programs, it reduced resources and attention from the important ones. Another implicit criticism of PART was that it provided simply another data collection exercise, but did little to foster the use of data. Zients said: "The test of a performance management system is whether it is used…the current approach fails this test. Congress doesn't use it. Agencies don't use it. And it doesn't produce meaningful information for the public" (Zients, 2009a) . Zients' comments reflect a basic failing of the performance movement: while governments have invested significant resources in creating routines of performance data creation, verification, and dissemination, they have invested almost nothing in fostering routines of performance information use.
OMB appointees have identified two themes that directly relate to performance management. The first is focusing leaders on what matters. In testimony to Congress, Zients said: "During my 20 years in the private sector as a CEO and advisor to CEOs, I found that leadership, measurement, and a motivated workforce create the foundation for good performance. I am confident that the same is true in government" (Zients, 2009a) . Zients has also argued that one of the common problems with agency leaders is that their incentives are to focus on developing new policy areas, rather than on the success of existing policy. Such leaders consider themselves policy entrepreneurs rather than managers. As a result, performance initiatives are given short shrift (Zients, 2009b) . Under Obama's leadership, the OMB has asked each agency head to identify three to eight goals as they submit their budget requests. Leaders are being told that they will be held accountable for these goals for the duration of their position, and that such goals should cascade through the organization so that they connect with lower-level objectives. By limiting the number of performance goals, the OMB hopes to focus leadership attention and to create a sense of ownership. The OMB has also offered agencies the opportunity to win new funds for evaluations of existing programs, thereby hoping to supplement the key performance goals with more in-depth evaluation information.
A second emerging theme is accelerating results. The OMB has emphasized that it wants to spread improvement ideas quickly across government. This means encouraging greater use of performance data and dissemination of lessons. One mechanism to do so will be the new Performance Improvement Council, which is made up of the agency Performance Improvement Officers. This group will meet on a regular basis, exchanging ideas on best practices. Another aspect is what Zients has described as "relentless review and accountability," through performance-driven meetings within and across agencies (Zients, 2009a) . One of Zients' deputies, Shelley Metzenbaum, has urged that goal-focused, data-driven meetings should become a basic characteristic of the Obama administration, from the President on down (Metzenbaum, 2009) .
In terms of tone, Obama appointees want to project a style distinct from previous presidencies. While Zients suggested that Clinton and Gore's Reinventing Government was too decentralized ("let a thousand flowers bloom"), he also criticized the Bush OMB as as overly-controlling in its interaction with agencies, resulting in a good deal of agency resistance (Zients, 2009b) . By contrast, the Obama OMB declares that it wants to create a "focused collaboration" with agencies, characterized by principles of prioritization, transparency, engagement, and rapid results.
An early example of this approach is the process by which agencies were asked to create three to eight key metrics. Even as agencies were pushed to adopt such goals, they were also given significant autonomy in deciding what these goals would be (although the OMB reserved the right to press them if they felt that these were not adequate). But even as OMB appointees discuss a desire to switch their role from "cop" to "coach" in their relationship with agencies, this is easier said than done. The OMB's power to influence agencies has traditionally been tied to its control over the budget, a power more akin to a nightstick than a pep-talk.
The Impact and Implications of Performance Regimes
The ultimate impact of Obama's performance initiatives, as with any such reform, depends upon on how public officials respond to them. Advocates of performance management assume that public officials will use data to help them to make better decisions and improve public outcomes. This is possible, but only one of a variety of potential responses. The remainder of this article considers the heterogeneity of possible responses to performance regimes, which have distinct implications for governance, while offering potential areas of study for political science.
Passive Response: The Triumph of Politics
One potential response to performance systems may be passive compliance and deflection, as public officials do the minimum necessary to respond to the procedural requirements of the reform, but little else. This is a familiar scenario. Reforms that present themselves as offering a more rational process of governing can be undermined by the tenacity of politics (Downs and Larkey, 1986 ). This storyline is centered on the logic that elected officials prioritize partisan and ideological factors, serving constituents, and media coverage over performance data. It also reflects how patterns of decision-making are the product of entrenched processes and agreements. Incrementalism, after all, works because it is an effective means of managing political conflict (Wildavsky and Caiden, 2003) . Performance systems that run contrary to such basic political norms will necessarily be given secondary consideration.
Even if bureaucrats perceive results-based reform as a good idea at some level, they may also see little point in devoting much effort to it when political actors are unresponsive. For example, Radin (2000) reports that agencies were rebuffed when they asked congressional actors to consider performance information. A later review documented how some agencies pursued "a narrow compliance strategy. In this approach, agencies simply describe what they are already doing but package that description in a way that appears to meet the requirements" (Radin, 2006) .
In general, bureaucrats have been justified in their belief that performance information will not affect resource allocation. Performance-based reforms often are championed by political officials in the executive branch, but ultimately it is the legislature that determines the budget. In any event, agency leadership determines whether agencies go beyond a compliance strategy (Broadnax and Conway, 2001) . Case evidence suggests that agency leaders will deliberately pursue a passive compliance strategy when the legislature is not paying attention to performance information and when agency resources are constrained (Moynihan, 2008) .
The "triumph of politics" argument has been used to explain the failure of performance reforms in the past (Downs and Larkey, 1986; Wildavsky and Caiden, 2003) . It persuades on a number of levels. There is a parable atmosphere of naive reformers disappointed by the reality of politics. There is the logic of old and entrenched systems remaining in the face of new reforms. And such arguments are made persuasive by the details of failure: a simple comparison of the lofty goals of reformers with the actual practice of government inevitably shows a stark contrast.
But there are also reasons to suggest that the "triumph of politics" argument has become overstated. The persuasiveness of detail on reform failure often obscures wider patterns of change. Certainly, most performance reforms fail, if by failure we mean that they do not achieve the wildly unrealistic targets of reformers -often deliberately overstated in order to create momentum for change -in a very short period of time. But over the course of decades, the accumulation of such reforms has and will result in a fundamental change in the culture of governance. New systems are not entirely displaced in this process, but neither are they left unchanged.
Compliance and deflection is also less feasible in the face of continuity of performance systems. Contemporary performance reforms often have a permanent statutory basis (e.g., GPRA), and both Bush and Obama showed a willingness to build on inherited processes. This makes it impossible for bureaucrats simply to wait out reforms until the next administration. Ignoring performing systems is also risky because elected officials are showing increasing interest in performance data -they might not use it systematically, but they sometimes use it for purposes of control and micromanagement (Dull, 2006; Durant, 1999) . Finally, performance information also provides ammunition for reporters and opponents of a particular program (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Gormley and Weimer, 1999) . In short, performance is becoming part of politics, and politics is part of performance. This context is discussed in the next section.
Political Response: The Integration of Advocacy and Measurement
Political debate is constituted of narratives, about how the world works, which groups are deserving and undeserving, and what policies will succeed (Stone, 1997) . Majone (1989) points out that policy analysis "has less to do with formal techniques of problem solving than with the process of argument." Performance metrics play an increasingly important role in these narratives. How are measures used in political dialogue? The answer depends much upon our conception of the nature of performance measures.
Moynihan (2008) contrasts two models: that of performance management doctrine, and of an interactive dialogue model. Performance management doctrine is the argument made by advocates of performance reforms. Underlying the doctrine of performance management are a set of assumptions about the nature and effects of performance data: that performance information is objective, neutral, standardized, indicative of actual performance, consistently understood, and prompts a consensus about how a program is performing and how it should be funded.
The interactive dialogue model draws from a contrasting set of assumptions. Performance information for any moderately complex program cannot be comprehensive, since there exist a greater number of goals, and ways of measuring those goals, than will be captured by the measures actually chosen. Which goals are selected and how they are measured will affect whether a program is defined as performing or not, and will influence what managerial strategies are seen as affecting results (Heinrich and Fournier, 2004; NicholsonCrotty et al., 2006) .
At the same time, performance data are ambiguous. They do not tell us why performance did or did not occur, the context of performance, how implementation occurred, how outside factors influenced performance, which goals are most important, or what tradeoffs were made with other goals. There is, therefore, likely to be no single definitive approach to interpreting what performance information means, or how it should direct decisions. As a consequence, data do not so much support a given answer as they afford ammunition for advocates of various perspectives on a given problem or issue.
Performance data are also likely to be subjective. Actors will select, present, and interpret information consistent with their institutional interests and ideological beliefs (Moynihan, 2008; Radin, 2006) . The selection of goals itself occurs within a political context and different stakeholders will prefer one measure over another (Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2006) , with agency or program representatives selecting the data that portray them most favorably and using performance data to legitimate their activities and construct policy narratives (Van de Walle and Bovaird, 2007) . Likewise, in cases where attribution of causality is difficult, agents may claim credit when the results are positive and deny responsibility when things turn sour (Hood, 2006) .
In short, the use of performance information is a subjective exercise that often amplifies rather than reduces the ambiguity of data. Actors selectively present performance information that supports their point of view, discount conflicting information, and put the best possible spin on the data. The multidimensional and ambiguous nature of performance data makes advocacy possible, while the political environment encourages subjectivity. As such, disagreement about the relevance and interpretation of performance information will increase among heterogeneous groups. The use of performance information across political institutions designed to check one another and represent opposing viewpoints will be more likely to be characterized by competing interpretations rather than consensus.
This interactive dialogue perspective offers a variety of interesting avenues for research. For example, researchers can investigate the social construction of policy and performance. The definition and interpretation of performance measures provides perhaps the best way of studying what Stone (1997) identifies as the crucial role of numbers in political narratives: "Numbers in politics are measures of human activities, made by human beings, and intended to influence human behavior. They are subject to conscious and unconscious manipulation by the people being measured, the people making the measurements, and the people who interpret and use measures made by others." Simply documenting such processes would be an invaluable contribution to understanding contemporary political dialogue.
The social construction of performance data raises ancillary questions. Under what conditions are actors motivated to use numbers for advocacy purposes? What incentives make this more or less likely? When is performance advocacy persuasive? For example, it seems reasonable to assume that performance advocacy is more likely to occur when elected officials and central agencies demand that budgets be tied to performance.
Another plausible hypothesis is that career bureaucrats are more likely to advocate, and more likely to be effective in advocacy, than appointed officials. For example, Lewis (2007) finds that programs managed by career officials score better than those managed by appointed officials on PART evaluations. While Lewis ascribes the finding to the greater managerial skills of career officials, a plausible alternative interpretation is that bureaucrats have a greater capacity for advocacy (since they enjoy an experiential basis to make convincing arguments) and also a greater incentive to advocate (since they are more likely to care strongly about their programs).
Another question to consider: to what extent does performance advocacy actually influence -or provide a rationale -for decisions? Thus far, there remains little evidence that performance initiatives such as PART have influenced decision-making in a systematic way. But this may be because there is unlikely to be a clear directional relationship between performance data and decisions such as resource allocation. If performance data is indeed ambiguous, then the actual content of the data, in terms of representing success or failure, is unlikely to matter much. That does not mean that performance data is not considered. Instead, it suggests that what is important is how well it is presented and the skill of the advocate framing the data. Thus far, empirical analyses have not tested the quality of performance advocacy in decision models.
Understanding the political uses of performance data is also of relevance to students of bureaucratic politics, because the capacity to construct data is related to administrative power. Administrative reforms tend to provide new authority to some actors in the policy process, while bringing others under closer scrutiny. In the case of performance reforms, central budget offices are usually given new authority, ensuring that other agencies comply with reporting requirements. Under the Bush administration, the PART process enhanced the power of the OMB and the White House more broadly.
In some cases this has straightforward partisan overtones. PART was viewed as being ideological by Democrats, and did indeed appear to score programs created under Democratic administrations lower than those created under Republican administrations (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006) . But PART also provided the OMB with a more subtle agenda-setting power, by way of the seemingly neutral tool of performance management. It could direct agencies on what goals were appropriate, or more often, on how to measure them in another way. One relatively unnoticed component of PART was that it generated OMB management recommendations for agencies to implement. The majority of such recommendations actually required agencies to develop new performance assessment metrics that better satisfied OMB criteria for success (Moynihan, 2008) .
From the agency perspective, the relationship with the central overseer has changed, such that performance is a new dimension that must be managed. Agency managers sought to influence (with varying degrees of success) how the OMB evaluated them, debating what were reasonable measures of outcomes and what constituted acceptable forms of evidence of performance. Some case studies suggested that agency managers focused as much on building better relationships with evaluators and better communicating their achievements rather than on using the PART tool to make real improvements (Gilmour, 2006) .
Legislative actors, who have generally been less likely to set the terms for performance reporting processes, seem on first inspection to be losing out on this new avenue of agency oversight. But the response of Congress to PART was instructive. Congress rejected proposals to provide a statutory basis for PART, and largely ignored PART recommendations in budget decisions (Heinrich, 2009) . Appropriations committees were also antagonistic toward OMB efforts to redesign budget submissions around performance goals. In some cases, the committees explicitly warned agencies not to submit their budget requests using a performance format.
While this experience suggests that Congress was uninterested in performance, it may instead simply reflect a body jealous of its institutional prerogatives. Indeed, a close look at the language of appropriations bills and hearings during the Bush era indicate that legislators do talk about performance. They rarely seem to consider actual performance outcomes, but legislators are very adept at calling on agencies to provide more performance data on specific items of interest (Moynihan, 2008) . In this, at least, Congress resembles the White House. Both bodies have used performance management to demand ever-more performance information from the agencies under their purview.
Perverse Response: Gaming and Goal Displacement
Public officials may also respond to performance systems in ways that are perverse to the basic goals of reforms and damaging to actual performance. Most frequently, this comes in the form of gaming indicators, or goal displacement. These types of moral hazard are fostered both by difficulty in adequately measuring the multidimensionality of public sector performance and by difficulty in finding measures that perfectly reflect the underlying missions they ask agents to pursue. Gaming occurs when agents strategically select goals or measures that portray them favorably, hide or do not collect metrics that portray them unfavorably, time their efforts to align with incentives, change measures constantly to prevent comparison, or alter the measurement process.
Agents who pursue the most obvious, readily measured, or incentive-laden goals engage in a form of goal displacement, resulting in the deliberate or inadvertent oversight of unmeasured goals. As a result, efficiency goals often are pursued at the expense of program quality, short-term goals over long-term measures of effectiveness, and easy-to-measure goals over more ambiguous goals.
There is now extensive empirical evidence that perverse uses of data is a real problem Marschke, 2004, 2007; Heinrich, 2004 Heinrich, , 2007 Hood, 2006; Talbot, 2004; van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002) . The practice of tying highpowered incentives to performance indicators is most prevalent in highly incentivized contracts with non-governmental actors, but it has also been observed in bureaucratic settings (Hood, 2006; Jacob and Levitt, 2006) .
The existence of both perverse and political responses to performance regimes suggests one profound irony. The adoption of performance reporting systems, and the tying of performance metrics to financial incentives, is consistent with the basic recommendations of agency theory, which promised that performance data would eliminate information asymmetry between principals and agents. But performance systems have become one more means by which agents can exploit asymmetry. Given the breadth of possible information that any moderately complex program could legitimately produce, and the range of interpretations associated with this information, the substantive expertise of the agent remains important.
The study of the evolution of performance systems provides an insight into the dynamic nature of principal-agent relationships. As long as gaming falls within the bounds of exploiting an incomplete contract rather than of illegality, bureaucrats will rarely be fired and contractors are unlikely to be dropped (Courty and Marschke, 2007; Heinrich and Choi, 2007) . Across multiple games, agents and principals adopt new strategies in response to the actions of the other. Governments try to learn from the last round of contracting and then adjust the performance framework through supplementary or additional measures, or additional input and process controls. Yet agents, in turn, learn how to game the new system. Agency theory has been criticized elsewhere for failing to incorporate norm-based or intrinsic incentives on the part of agents (Brehm and Gates, 1999) . Since moral hazard is judged to emerge from adverse selection of agents, selecting individuals who are intrinsically motivated by policy substance and client outcomes (rather than by self-interest) provides another means to reduce the potential for perversity -especially goal displacement. But the increasing prevalence of performance regimes threatens to "crowd out" such intrinsic motivations, diminishing the value of any effort not tied to an incentive, as well as discouraging the selection of intrinsically motivated individuals (Moynihan, 2010) . Another irony emerges: the need for responsible and public-spirited individuals provides perhaps the best check against the exploitation of incomplete contracts, but the reliance on performance-based incentives deters those individuals. While the study of "crowding out" effects has been primarily of interest to psychology and behavioral economics, it is relevant for political science. It can inform agency theory, while helping us to understand who agents are and what motivates them.
Perverse use of performance systems has implications for other research areas. In particular, research on policy feedback between the state and citizens has begun to incorporate the implications of performance management. Citizens treated as units in a performance logic model may in some cases experience better service, but in other cases may experience declines in service quality, deliberate efforts to limit access to service, little autonomy in their interactions with service providers, and little sense of how to assert accountability in the process. Studies of the citizen-state interaction in the privatized welfare system have documented just such experiences (Dias and Maynard-Moody, 2007; Soss et al., 2008) . Policy feedback work predicts that such interactions are likely to reduce the civic capacity and social capital of citizens, and weaken trust in the state (Mettler and Soss, 2004) .
Such negative forms of goal displacement are made possible because performance systems are focused on measuring program mission and are largely negligent of other democratic values, such as equity, transparency, due process, and citizenship. Managers are trained to develop logic models between inputs and outcomes, but are not trained or otherwise encouraged to consider that democratic values are part of that logic model, and that these values have profound impact on citizens. This is true even in programs where democratic values are directly relevant to mission. For example, Radin (2006) argues that performance assessment or programs with redistributive goals generally fail to measure impact on different groups, while Wichowsky and Moynihan (2008) find that programs with empirically demonstrated impacts on citizenship do not attempt to measure these impacts.
Purposeful Strategy: Goal-Based Learning and Improvement
Passive, political, or perverse responses suggest the unintended consequences of performance-based bureaucracy, and the naiveté of reformers. But bureaucrats also may use results-based reforms to improve services. There is some empirical evidence that performance management practices lead to organizational learning and increased effectiveness, though this evidence is rarer and less rigorous than advocates would expect and hope (Boyne and Chen, 2007; Kelman and Friedman, 2009) . Why is it so difficult to know if performance management performs? There are a number of data and methodological reasons.
First, it is difficult isolate the effects of an administrative reform/process from the many variables that both separately affect performance and interact with performance management. These variables include administrative autonomy, agency clientele and stakeholders, political context, nature of function, goal clarity, resources, worker/client characteristics and beliefs, organizational culture, leadership, and incentives (Moynihan, 2009) . Second, developing acceptable measures of performance are problematic for the reasons discussed in previous sections. For example, a performance measure chosen to be the dependent variable may increase at the expense of some unmeasured aspect of performance. Third, as governments adopt performance systems, there are no experimental controls, making it difficult to develop clear counterfactuals as to what performance would have been if no performance system was introduced.
Despite this, the idea that performance systems can improve performance remains their core appeal. For this to be the case, a logical intermediate process to consider is that performance data are actually used to make decisions. As discussed above, it may be unrealistic to hope that legislatures or presidents use performance data in any systematic fashion. It is more reasonable to believe that use of performance data will occur by managers within agencies. Studying the use of performance data among bureaucrats offers a tractable means of studying the impact of performance reforms. Van Dooren (2008) argues that, "if we want to study the successes and failures of performance movements, we have to study the use of performance information".
More broadly, the use of performance information suggests the type of purposeful and goal-oriented behavior that elected officials and members of the public say they want from bureaucrats. The Obama-led OMB, as noted above, has pointed to performance information use as a key focus of their efforts. There is not, thus far, much research to guide their efforts. Empirical studies of the use of performance information point to a number of key factors: committed and engaged leadership; the availability and quality of information; routines of performance consideration; resource availability; and, a supportive organizational culture (Moynihan and Pandey, 2009) .
By and large, this research has been driven more by organization studies, rather than political science. Given that the use of performance information occurs in a political context, this inevitably means that political factors do matter, and indeed, a variety of studies have shown that factors such as credible commitment, legislative involvement, term limits, political conflict, and ideology are significant (Askim et al., 2008; Bourdeaux and Chikoto, 2008; Dull, 2009b; Moynihan and Ingraham, 2004) . More such work is needed to help understand how political context affects the workings of purposeful use of performance data.
Conclusion
President Obama will soon outline a formal agenda for improving the performance of the federal government. In this, he follows the pattern of recent presidents. Such efforts are frequently judged as failures (Dull, 2009b) . But the increasing prevalence and continuity of performance metrics means that they have real and ongoing effects. Performance management is not going away anytime soon. Better mapping its impact and implications represents both a challenge and opportunity for anyone interested in the evolution of the administrative state.
